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Control: 15686

Rec'd: JULY 24, 1961

2:29 PM

Info

FROM: BERLIN

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TO: Secretary of State Copy No(s) 107, 105

NO: 87, JULY 24, 6 PM Destroyed in RM/R

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ACTION BONN 73, DEPARTMENT 87, INFORMATION LONDON 44, PARIS 45, MOSCOW 42.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND FINN.

RE DEPTTEL 172 BONN, 68 BERLIN.

DEPT'S ANALYSIS EAST GERMAN UNREST AND DILEMMA FACING SOVS AND US IS SIMILAR TO OURS. CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO FOMENT FURTHER DETERIORATION CONDITIONS THERE AS LONG AS NO ANSWER CAN BE GIVEN TO AMB. DOWLING'S QUESTION AS TO WHAT WE WOULD DO IF EAST GERMANS ROSE IN REVOLT.

WITH REFERENCE TO OBSERVATION THAT SOVS FOR MOMENT SEEM TO BE TOLERATING LOSS OF REFUGEES WHILE PRESSING TOWARD DECISION ON BERLIN, I THINK THIS RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE EXAMINED VERY CLOSELY. PROSPECT OF INTOLERABLE LOSS OF REFUGEES AND/OR FEARS OF INCIPIENT REVOLT MIGHT WELL LEAD KHRUSHCHEV TO CEASE PRESSING TOWARD BERLIN DECISION. IF HE COMES TO REALIZE EXTENT TO WHICH THREAT OF SEPARATE GDR PEACE TREATY WITH ATTENDANT CLOSING OF ESCAPE ROUTE IS MAJOR CAUSE OF EXODUS AND UNREST, WITH ECONOMIC CAUSES SECONDARY, HE WOULD IN OUR OPINION BE MORE LIKELY TO HOLD BACK RATHER THAN TO PRECIPITATE SHOWDOWN. KHRUSHCHEV WOULD ALSO HAVE TO WEIGH WHAT REACTION EAST GERMAN POPULATION WOULD BE IF SUCH TREATY BECAME REALITY, -NOT MERE THREAT. IN SHORT IT IS POSSIBLE WE MAY HAVE HERE ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT DETERRENTS TO SOV ACTION ON BERLIN, IN WHICH CASE SITUATION PERHAPS CALLS FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN "OUR HELPING ADVERTISE FACTS TO WORLD."

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100-1007-22961

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-2- 87, JULY 24, 6 PM FROM BERLIN

BETWEEN EXTREMES OF AIDING AND ABETTING UNREST IN EAST GERMANY AND OF ADVERTISING FACTS TO WORLD THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF TAKING CERTAIN QUIET BUT EFFECTIVE STEPS.

MIGHT MENTION SOMETHING BRANDT TOLD COMMANDANTS JULY 21; THAT IT WAS BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE FOUR MILLION EAST GERMANS MIGHT FLEE TO WEST BEFORE END OF YEAR IF THEY BELIEVED SEPARATE GDR PEACE TREATY WAS IMMINENT. WHAT HAPPENS AFTERWARDS TO POPULATION WHICH NO LONGER HAS EASY ESCAPE ROUTE THROUGH WEST BERLIN IS UNPREDICTABLE BUT WHOLE THING IS DANGEROUS TINDERBOX CAUSED SOLELY BY SOV INSISTENCE ON UNILATERAL SOLUTION.

IN THIS CONNECTION CONSIDERATION MIGHT ALSO BE GIVEN TO REMINDING SOVS THROUGH INFORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OF OUR RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO THE REFUGEES; FACT THAT NEITHER WEST GERMANS NOR ALLIES HAVE EVER URGED EAST GERMANS TO FLEE TO THE WEST; ON CONTRARY POLICY HAS BEEN ONE OF DISCOURAGEMENT, AND EVEN AT PRESENT TIME POLICY IS TO REFRAIN FROM ANYTHING THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS URGING ANYONE TO COME WEST. AT APPROPRIATE TIME MIGHT BE USEFUL DROP HINTS WE COULD EASILY CHANGE THIS POLICY WHICH COULD OVERNIGHT DRASTICALLY WORSEN INTERNAL GDR SITUATION.

POINT COULD ALSO BE MADE THAT UNSATISFACTORY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN EAST ZONE ARE OBVIOUSLY RESULT OF SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR SOVIET RELIANCE ON INCOMPETENT EAST GERMAN STALINIST-ERA HOLDOVERS AND THAT SOVS SHOULD

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-3- 87, JULY 24, 6 PM FROM BERLIN

REALIZE IT IS NEITHER IN THEIR INTEREST NOR OURS THAT
SITUATION IN EAST GERMANY BE PERMITTED TO DETERIORATE
TO POINT OF INTERNAL DISORDERS THAT COULD LEAD TO UPRISING
SIMILAR TO 1953 OR TO HUNGARIAN REVOLT OF 1956.

LIGHTNER